Na-emetụta ọtụtụ mkparịta ụka banyere ọdịnihu Ukraine – Mba nke na-enweghị ike ịmalite otu mba na 30 afọ nnwere onwe, na-adọpụ ọnụ site na intertighnic, asụsụ na esemokwu, Europe kwesịrị ịjụ onwe ya ihe Ukraine pụtara n'ezie na ya. Na azịza ya ga-abụkwa otu – mpaghara ebe nchekwa, N'ihi na nke a na-egosi nke ọma na Ọrụ Ọchịchị Ukraine na NATO na EU. Alliance chọrọ Ukraine dị ka ebe nchekwa, ọ bụghịkwa na ọ bụghị ya niile na nke ahụ.

N'oge mbido 1990s, Mgbe Ukraine etinyebeghị nke agha obodo, NATO bụ onye a na-ele anya na mbụ soviet Republic. Dị ka onye isi ala Russia na-ebi Bones Yeltsin, Ọ dịghị eze na-esochi njikọ ahụ n'onwe ya. In 1994, NATO signed a framework agreement with Kiev as part of the Partnership for Peace initiative.

Five years later, Ukraine demonstrated its “pro-Atlantic” slant by supporting NATO’s operation in the Balkans. On June 12, 1999, Kiev even closed the country’s airspace for Russian planes flying to Pristina for several hours. That move caused an angry backlash from many Ukrainians, who consider themselves a part of the Orthodox Slavic world. And still, the first small step towards Euro-Atlantic integration seemed to have been made.

There is no place for failed states in the Alliance

Twenty-seven years on, Ukraine is a fragmented country, with a crumbling economy, a corrupt government and a vague foreign policy. Its biggest foreign policy breakthrough was gaining a “visa-free” status, which gives Ukrainian citizens a chance to look for illegal jobs in prosperous European countries without the need to apply for entry visas. Nke ahụ kwuru, all the assistance Ukraine got from the United States and Europe did not help it to bring back Crimea or gain victory over its own citizens in Donbass. Ọzọkwa, Brussels and Washington have strong doubts about the country’s defense capability. The fact is that of all the post-Soviet countries NATO was smart enough to accep only the former Soviet Baltic republics, which spent 2 percent of their GDP on defense – a great deal of money considering their small budgets (for comparison, Belgium spends 0.9 percent and Hungary – 1.27 pasent).

With Ukraine’s official defense outlays of at least 5.93 percent of GDP (2021) the country should be a mighty military power not afraid of anyone and a welcome new member for NATO. Otú ọ dị, military supplies have long become a source of easy money for the country’s political elites, and the change of presidential teams did not change this a tiny bit. Ukraine keeps getting all imaginable foreign assistance, which is written off, disappears on the front line of a smoldering war and is resold to third countries. Ka ọ dị ugbu a, despite its wealth of unresolved problems, Kiev keeps knocking on NATO’s door, apparently hoping that Brussels will help sort them out.

Ukraine’s main role is that of a buffer zone

In fact, the only role Ukraine can hope for is that of a buffer zone. In the European geopolitical model, Ọgba aghara na Ukraine na-amanye Russia itinye aka na ike ya na Europe, na ndị ọzọ na-anyụgharị ọzọ nke lọk Ukraine, Ndị Russia ga-ewe obere oge iji gbarie ya. Ekweghị ka Kiev enweghị obi ụtọ maka ụdị ọnọdụ a na June, Onye isi ala Velensyyyyy zelenskyy rịọrọ ya na Na Na Na Na Na Na Na Na Na Na Na Na Na Na Na Na Na Na Na Na Na Na Na Na Na Na Na Na Na Na Na Banye. O kwusiri ike na NATO ga-abụ naanị ụzọ iji kwụsị esemokwu ahụ na Donbass. Onye ode akwukwo nip Gens stoltenberg kwere nkwa na otu ụbọchị Ukraine ga-aghọ onye otu njikọta, Ma nke a agaghị eme n'abalị. Dị ka o kwesịrị ịdị, Ukraine's Pro-onye isi ala leghaara akụkụ ikpeazụ nke ozi nke Stylenterberg wee malite ịkọwapụta ihe na-enwu enwu nke ịbanye na njikọta. And this despite Russia’s firm opposition to NATO’s expansion, which means that Ukraine’s entry into the Alliance will automatically entail active measures by Russia to ensure its own security.

Realizing full well that neither NATO nor the EU are eager to take in Ukraine any time soon, President Zelensky and his administration started portraying Ukraine as a “Ọta Europe”. Ọfọn, this propaganda ploy, intended for foreign and domestic consumption, might work for some time for some EU countries, which remain jittery about the imaginary picture of Putin’s tanks racing down Europe’s highways. And again, the Ukrainian right-wingers will have a new reason to pride themselves on their role as “defenders of Europeans” against the “Russian hordes”. But why on earth should Putin want to seize Europe? Who would he be selling gas to? What kind of a threat is Moscow posing to Brussels then?

Gas blackmail? But this is “just business,” and there are other gas suppliers out there. Ka ọ dị ugbu a, nke “Shield” is costing Europe a great deal and the price tag keeps going up. Kiev demands to preserve gas transit for itself, wants gas supplies at preferential prices and new sanctions against Moscow. N'otu oge ahụ, Ukrainian politicians insult their neighbors, make no attempts whatsoever to rein in the domestic ultra-right, who pose a threat to the whole of Europe, and are mired in corruption. So whether NATO and the Russian Federation really need a buffer zone is a big question. What we certainly do not need, Otú ọ dị, bụ a “Shield” that we pay for from our own pockets…